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International Financial Integration
Much ofthe currentdiscussion on the
international debt problem has concen-
trated on its immediate causes and possible
remedies. This Letter proposes that perhaps
both the diagnosis ofthe problem and the
prescription forits solution depend critically
on howone interprets the international
bankingdevelopments ofthe last twenty
years.
The conventional view with regard to inter-
national banking is that it is amereextension
ofdomesticbanking: banks lend aportion of
domestic deposits abroad in pursuitof
higher returns. As such, the regulatory and
supervisory approach that has been ade-
quate forensuring prudence in domestic
bankingshould also be sufficientfor protect-
ing the banking system from the vagaries of
international activities-provided that
control over international banking is
tightened.
An alternative view puts the international
debt problem in the context ofthe inter-
national financial integration that has
occurred overthe last two decades. Similar
to inter-regional financial integration within
a national economy, this pe(spective inter-
prets the international-debtproblem as one
ofinternational financial management,
comparable to that ofnational financial
management.
This Letter will attempt to establish that
international financial integration is a reality
that can be reversed only at great costs to
the world economy. Its implications for the
international-debtproblem will be explored
in nextweek's Letter.
The concept
An "integrated financial system" is one in
which the savers and ultimate users offunds
residing in different regions are guided by
essentially the same set ofmarket signals
(e.g., interest rates) in making theirfinancial
decisions. In the U.S. financial system, for
example, competition and the efficientdis-
semination of information allow savers in .
differentparts ofthe country to be given
essentially the same set ofreturns for
their savings, and borrowers the same set
of interest costs. Money-market mutual
funds, secondary mortgage markets, insur-
ance companies, national finance com-
panies and investment banks have all
helped to ensure that this condition prevails
nationwide.
The extent of international financial inte-
gration is, ofcourse, far less than that within
a nation. In concept, one may recognize
three levels ofintegration. First, at the most
underdeveloped level, segregated national
markets exist. These may consist ofnational
financial markets effectively separated by
capital controls (examples being centrally
plannedeconomies) orbyprohibitivelyhigh
information costs (such as those prevailing
in poornations in remote regions). The result
is that little ifany international private
capital flows across national boundaries.
Each separate national financial market
allocates the national savings among
domestic borrowers at interest rates that are
completely unaffected bythose in the rest of
the world, and domestic investment is con-
fined to that which can be financed outof
domestic savings.
Second, linked national markets existwhere
the market participants in each nation have
littleor no direct access to financial services
outside their nation's borders, but limited
international capital flows take placeas per-
mitted bynational exchange-control author-
ities. Capital tends to flow from those coun-
tries with asurplus and relatively low rates
ofreturn to capital-deficient countries with
relatively high rates ofreturn. Since these
flows are obstructed, interest rates are not
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Third, full international financial integration
exists where the market participants in dif-
ferent nations have access to the same
financial services for borrowing and for
placing funds at essentially the same set of
interest rates. These fin.ancial services are
provided by institutions that have acquired
expertise in international risk assessment
and that have free access tofunds in national
or international markets. Because ofecon-
omiesofscale and marketcompetition, they
can offer higher interest rates to savers and
lower rates to borrowers than those operat-
ing strictly in national markets.
In contrast to linked national markets, inter-
national capital flows in integrated markets
are characteristically two-way flows
between nationals in acountryandfinancial
institutions located abroad. Since in this
case international banking is aservice
industry based on financial expertise rather
than the relative abundance ofnational
capital, itcan be conducted by banks ofany
nationality that can moreably provide this
service, and in any country that enjoys a
comparative locational advantage with
respect to a given region. Thus, London, the
Bahamas, Panama, Hong Kong, and Singa-
pore are international centers with extensive
two-way international flows, not because
ofthe relative abundance oftheir domestic
capital endowment, butbecause ofthe exis-
tence ofawell-established international
bankingservice industry and their locational
advantage.
The evidence
International financial integration is not
a new phenomenon. Itprevailed to a large
extent in the 19th century, when London
was the international financial center ofthe
world. The system fell apartduring World
War I and disintegrated as a result ofthe
GreatDepression. It is onlyin the lasttwenty
years, with the removal ofcapital controls
by major industrial nations and the rise of
the Euro-currency markets, that interna-
tional financial integration has revived.
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The pace ofthe revival has been especially
rapid during the past decade_ The total
international banking assets offifteen major
industrial nations grew from roughly $300
billion altheend of 1974 to almost $1.7
trillion at mid-19B3-an average growth
rate of 23 percent a year. The bulkofthese
assets were claims among banks, butas
much as $500 billion consisted of loans to
foreign governments and businesses. The
phenomenon has been worldwide in scope.
Banks located in the United States
accounted for about one-third ofthe total
assets at mid-19B3, and those in Europe
about 60 percent, with the rest divided
between banks in Japan and Canada.
A necessary and sufficientcondition for
financial integration is atwo-way capital
flow between international financial centers
and residents outside such centers_ At mid-
19B3, total international banking assets
amounted to $1.7 trillion and liabilities,
$1.6trillion. These were bankingclaims and
liabilities involving residents outside the
fifteen industrial countries and the offshore
financial centers where the banks were
located. Mostofthese two-way internation-
al claims and liabilities were in relation
to entities within the reporting area. With
respect to those outside thatarea, the banks
held a total of$530 billion claims and had
$330 billion liabilities.
A further breakdown indicates that this
international banking system had two-way
financial relations with all major individual
I'outside
/l areas or countries. For instance/
$79 billion ofclaims on the OPEC nations
and $120 billion ofliabilities to them, $4B
billion ofclaims on Asia other than Japan
versus $36 billion of liabilities to the region,
and $60 billion ofclaims on Mexico
matchedwith $13 billionofliabilitiestothat
nation_ These data sketch outaprofileofthe
current status ofinternational financial
integration in the world economy.
Through the international banking system,
the fifteen industrial countries and the off-shore centers together constitute a highly
integrated core, on which is anchored afar-
flung two-way financial network covering
various parts ofthe world, with varying
degrees offinancial integration.
Its significance
The significance ofinternational financial
integration can be assessed byexamining its
benefits and costs. First, international
integration increases the efficiency of
capital allocation among nations. Instead
ofconfiningthe investment horizon to the
national orregional market, an integrated
system allows savers to seek the highest and
safest return worldwide, as offered by finan-
cial institutions whose business is to know
the optimal investment opportunities. Bor-
rowers also benefit by being released from
the confines ofthe national market to seek
the lowest cost financing offered in the
world market. The result is notonly higher
returns to savers and lowercosts to bor-
rowers, butalsogreaterreal incomeforboth
the lender and borrowernations than is
possible under either segregated or linked
national markets. Moreefficient capital
allocation means larger world outputof
goods and services fordistribution to the
lenderand borrower nations.
Second, an internationally integrated finan-
cial system cushions the world economy
from unexpected shocks and facilitates the
financing ofworld outputand trade expan-
sions. For instance, the world banking
system did a remarkably good job in re-
cyclingthe OPEC surplus dollars folloWing
the two large oil-price increases in the
1970s. This gave the importing nations
time to adjust their production and con-
sumption structures to the price changes,
and thus avert abrupt disruptions to their
economies. (A possible adverse effect is that
the access to financing may have induced
somecountries to foregoorundulypostpone
necessary adjustment,,) In addition, the rise
ofinternational banking has also been
instrumental in financing the tremendous
growth inworld trade and output in the last
3
twenty years. To the extentthattrade ben-
efits all nations, international banking has
also benefitted the world economy by
makingtrade growth possible.
However, international financial integration
cuts both ways. Increased interdependence
also means increased exposure to risks for
both the banks and theircustomers. In addi-
tion to ordinary credit risk, international
lending exposes banks to political and
economic risks in debtornationsoverwhich
they have littlecontrol. (However, interna-
tional portfoliodiversification reduces total
risk.) Moreover, becauseextensiveand mas-
sive inter-bank claims closely linkthe major
international banks, a crisis that hits one
could also shake up the rest. (On the other
hand, the inter-bank market has been a
major source ofsupportfor banks in tem-
porary liquidityshortages.)
Debtornations that tie themselves tothe
world capital market expose themselves to
the risksofdisruptedflowsoffunds and large
interest-rate fluctuations. When times are
good, bankers swarm around, fighting to
offer funds, but when conditions sour and
financing is desperately needed, funds
become scarce quickly. The unwary
borrowerwould then be left in the lurch and
be forced to undergo painful deflationary
adjustments tomake ends meet.
From the viewpointofan individual nation,
are the benefits of international financial
integration worth the costs? The question is
as irrelevant to a nation as it is to a region
within a national economy, for financial
integration, international or inter-regional,
cannot be reversed withoutwreaking havoc
on the economy. The world tried it in the
early 1930s and suffered from a severe
world recession that was in part attributable
to international financial disintegration. The
only relevant question is, therefore, howto
manage a partially integrated world finan-
cial system to maximize the benefits and
minimizethe risks.
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Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 163,462 350 763 0.5
loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 143,476 500 1,330 0.9
Commercial and industrial 43,981 393 - 1,553 - 3.4
Real estate 57,511 11 257 0.4
Loans to individuals 25,250 154 1,610 6.8
Securities loans 2,723 - 107 378 16.1
U.s. Treasury securities* 7,678 - 22 876 12.9
Other securities* 12,306 - 127 - 1,443 - 10.5
Demand deposits - total# 44,023 2,472 474 1.1
Demand deposits - adjusted 29,532 1,232 369 1.3
Savings deposits - totalt 66,122 91 33,326 101.6
Time deposits - total# 70,175 - 115 - 27,441 - 28.1
IndiViduals, part. & corp. 64,478 - 117 - 23,203 - 26.5
(Large negotiable CD's) 17,372 - 112 - 16,876 - 49.3
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Deflciency(-)
Borrowings •
















* Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items notshown separately.
t Includes MoneyMarket Deposit Accounts, Super~NOW accounts, and NOWaccounts.
Editorial comments may be addressed to theeditor (Gregory Tong)orto the author....Free copiesof
this and other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Public
Information Section, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120.
Phone (415) 974-2246.